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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH. No LONGER THAT
CRAZY AUNT IN THE BASEMENT, COMMERCIAL SPEECH JOINS THE FAMILY.

44 LIQUORMART, INC. v. RHODEISLAND, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
I. INTRODUCTION

"Make no law abridgingthe freedom of speech, "our preeminent guarantee,
Alive and well in the home of the brave, the strong,the fearless, the free.
Tune out the politicalclamor;you hear its pulse steady and strong,
Its promise has not been forsaken. Its beat goes steadfastly on.
Does the First Amendment' permit the government to censor truthful
informational advertisements in order to affect our economic and lifestyle
choices? In 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island, the United States Supreme
Court answered: No. 2 The Court thus ended a sixteen-year hiatus from the
ideas that the First Amendment prohibits the government from silencing
truthful speech and that in America, citizens may consider all information and
make decisions for themselves. Since 1980, the CentralHudson balancing test
had dominated the Court's commercial speech doctrine and allowed the
government to block the flow of truthful commercial information to
consumers. 3 Aided by the CentralHudson mechanism, our government could
make laws that suppressed commercial speech in order to influence prices and
consumer choice. But in 44 Liquormart, the Court relied on the First
Amendment to point the way in determining whether government can suppress
truthful speech, and the CentralHudson test took a back seat.' Never again
will truthful commercial speech be subjected to arbitrary balancing tests; no
longer may the government suppress commercial speech without consulting the
First Amendment.
This note will first set out the facts of 44 Liquormart,a case that marked
the beginning of true First Amendment protection for commercial speech.
Second, the note will outline the circuitous development of commercial speech
law, revealing that the freedom of commercial speech has often depended on
1.
freedom
2.
3.

The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
116S.Ct. 1495,1499(1996).
For a discussion of the Central Hudson test and its effects, see infra section

I11.A.4-5.

4. For a discussion of the Central Hudson test and its effects, see infra section
III.A.4-5.
5. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Souter advocated a "special care" review for
laws that suppress truthful commercial speech for reasons other than truth-in-advertising. 44
Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507. Justice Thomas called for strict review when speech
restrictions silence truthful commercial speech. See id. at 1515,1516 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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considerations other than the First Amendment. Next, the note will summarize
the reasoning of the Court in 44 Liquormart, explaining how four separate
opinions resulted in a unanimous judgment. Finally, the note will explore the
significance of the Court's decision in 44 Liquormartand predict a bleak future
for the Federal Drug Administration's plans to send the Marlboro Man riding
off into the sunset.
II. FACTS

In 1956, in the interest of promoting temperance, 6 Rhode Island enacted
two statutes that prohibited advertising the retail prices of alcoholic beverages
within the state's borders.7 For the next forty years, a consumer could peruse
the price of spirits in one place, and one place only: on tags or signs in liquor
stores.' The Rhode Island Liquor Control Board strictly enforced the State's
ban on price advertisements, 9 and Rhode Island's supreme court officially
upheld it.' ° But the beginning of the end for Rhode Island's advertising ban
came when 44 Liquormart, Inc. (Liquormart), a Rhode Island liquor store,
placed an advertisement in a 1991 edition of the Providence Joumal-Bulletin. "
6. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1502 (1996). In a post-trial
interview, Evan T. Lawson, counsel for 44 Liquormart stated: "I think the law was passed to
protect package stores from competition. ... What I have observed is that you can look at the
regulatory scheme; find what are regarded as anomalies and trace them back to whichever
segment of the industry had the most influence on the Legislature at any given time." Evan T.
Lawson, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 5, 1996, at B2.
How would the statutes effectively promote temperance? Rhode Island's theory was as
follows: (1) If liquor retailers did not advertise prices, there would be less price competition;
(2) If there were less price competition, prices would be higher, and (3) If prices were higher,
drinkers would not drink as much as they would if prices were lower. See 44 Liquormart, 116
S.Ct. at 1509.
7. The twin statutes collectively stamped out price advertisements from all possible
sources. One statute governed liquor manufacturers, wholesalers, shippers, and retailers. These
entities were forbidden to: "Advertis[e] in any manner whatsoever.. . the price of any malt
or distilled liquor offered for sale in this state; provided, however,
beverage, cordials, wine [,]
...this section shall not apply to price signs or tags attached to or placed on merchandise for
sale within the licensed premises .... Id. at 1501 n.2 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-7
(1987)). The second statute controlled the media and advertising firms. These entities were
forbidden to "accept, publish, or broadcast any advertisement... of the price or make reference
to the price of any alcoholic beverages." Id. at 1501 n.3 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3.8-8.1
(1987)).
8. The Liquor Control Administrator promulgated a regulation that provided "no placard
or sign that is visible from the exterior of a package store may make any reference to the price
of any alcoholic beverage." Id. at 1501 n.2. (quoting Regulation 32 of the Rules and
Regulations of the Liquor Control Administrator of Rhode Island).
9. See id. at 1503.
10. Seeid.at1502.
11.See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543, 545 (D.R.I. 1993). The
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The advertisement quoted low prices for Schweppes mixers, peanuts, and
potato chips and accented the bargains with the word "WOW."' 2 The "WOW"
exclamation, without mention of price, also appeared alongside pictures of
brand-name liquor bottles. 3 Liquormart's advertisement grabbed the attention
of local competitors, who in turn reported their discovery to Rhode Island's
Liquor Control Administrator, Kate Racine. 4 Without delay, Racine held a
hearing to determine whether Liquormart's ad violated the State's statutory
prohibition on price advertising. 5 She concluded that the veiled reference,
WOW, to low liquor prices violated the ban, ordered that the ad cease to run,
and fined Liquormart $400.16
Liquormart paid the fine, bypassed the state's appeal process, and filed
suit against Racine in the Federal District Court for Rhode Island. 7 Liquormart
charged that Rhode Island's interdiction of price advertising violated the First
Amendment by denying retailers their right to freedom of speech and
consumers their right to obtain factual information about a legal product.'
People's Super Liquor Stores, Inc., a Massachusetts liquor retailer, who
wanted to advertise prices in Rhode Island newspapers, joined as plaintiff.' 9
Additionally, the Rhode Island Liquor Store Association, who wanted to
protect small liquor retailers, intervened as defendant.20
Racine asserted that the Twenty-first Amendment 2' bolstered the validity
of the statutes in question and operated to shift the burden to Liquormart to
prove the statutes were unconstitutional. 22 However, the district judge held that
Providence Journal-Bulletin is a daily newspaper in Rhode Island. See id.
12. See44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1503.
13. See id.

14. See id.
15. See id. Liquormart's advertisement appeared in a December 1991 issue of the Journal,
and Racine held a hearing on December 11, 1991. 44 Liquormart, 829 F. Supp. 543, 545
(D.R.I. 1993).
16. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1503.
17. See id. Later in the litigation, the State of Rhode Island took Racine's place as

defendant. See id.
18. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495
(1996) (No. 94-1140).
19. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1503.
20. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1994). The Association
intervened because "if advertising of prices were to be allowed, its members 'would be obliged
to participate in the advertising arena and would be at a definite disadvantage when matched
up against retailers who hold multiple licenses."' Id. (quoting the alleged grounds for
Association's intervention). See supra note 6 (discussing the possibility that small liquor
retailers influenced the legislature to enact the advertising ban).
21. The Twenty-first Amendment provides: "The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
22. See 44 Liquormart, 829 F. Supp. at 551.
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the State could not use the Twenty-first Amendment as leverage to tilt First
Amendment review in its favor.23 As a result, Rhode Island shouldered the
burden of proving that its ban on commercial speech passed First Amendment
scrutiny under CentralHudson.24 After considering the evidence, the district
judge held that the advertisement ban did not directly advance the State's
interest, that the State could further its interest in temperance without
burdening commercial speech, and that the ban unconstitutionally abridged the
freedom of speech. 25 Rhode Island appealed.26
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district court's
decision. 27 The circuit court ruled that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the
statutes at issue a "presumption of validity"2 and noted that evidence of
whether the advertisement ban directly advanced the State's interest went "both
ways., 29 The court reasoned that because evidence of the statutes' effectiveness was inconclusive, Rhode Island was entitled to a "reasonable choice" in
selecting a method that would serve the State's interest3 ° and concluded that the
advertising ban was a permissible restriction of commercial speech.3
Liquormart petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. The
Court granted Liquormart's petition and framed the question it would resolve
as follows: under the First Amendment, 3may
Rhode Island ban factual, non2
prices?
liquor
of
advertisement
deceptive

23. See id. at 553.
24. See id. For an explanation of the CentralHudson test, see infra text accompanying
note 94.
25. See 44 Liquormart, 829 F. Supp. at 554-55.
26. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1994).
27. See id. at 9.
28. "[T]he presumption based on the Twenty-First Amendment... seems precisely in
order." Id. at 8.
29. See id. at 7. The circuit judge noted that there was no empirical evidence that Rhode
Island's statutes would be an effective way to promote temperance and that the expert testimony
offered in district court was inconclusive. See id. In district court, Liquormart presented two
expert witnesses who testified that studies did not show advertising liquor prices had a
significant influence on alcohol consumption. 44 Liquormart, 829 F. Supp. 543, 546 (D.R.I.
1993). Rhode Island presented a study that indicated alcohol prices influenced alcohol
consumption and that without a price advertisement ban, prices would decrease and
consumption would rise. Id. at 547-48. However, the district judge rejected the study because
it did not consider all pertinent factors in reaching its conclusion. Id. at 548. Additionally, the
State's expert witness agreed that banning liquor price advertisements would not insure liquor
prices would fall to the point that would decrease alcohol consumption. Id. at 549.
30. 44 Liquormart, 39 F.3d. at 7.
31. Id. at 8.
32. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. granted 115 S.
Ct. 1821 (1995) (No. 94-1140).
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III. BACKGROUND

In ten words, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from establishing
any law that curtails freedom of speech.3 3 Despite this straightforward
command, 34 the framers did not clarify how to fulfill the promise of free speech
in America, 35 and people disagree about the types of speech the First Amendment protects 36 and the forms of government action it prohibits. 37 As a result,
the guarantee of free speech has not received a literal reading in American
jurisprudence, 3 and the United States Supreme Court has produced a catalogue
33. See supra note I for text of the First Amendment.
34. The First Amendment provides a more categorical proscription against government
action than other provisions in the Bill of Rights. Other guarantees are qualified: The Fourth
Amendment guarantees against "unreasonable" searches and seizures; the Fifth Amendment
guarantees "due" process; and the Eight Amendment prohibits "excessive" bail. WILLIAM W.
VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 22 (1984).
35. The intent of the framers offers little guidance for adapting the words of the First
Amendment to present day claims to freedom of speech. See MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF

EXPRESSION A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 13 n.27 (1984). Furthermore, legal scholars who base their
First Amendment interpretation solely on the intent of the framers tend to change their minds
over time. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785 n.3 (2d.
ed. 1988). See also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A

TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 1.04[2] (1994) (explaining that Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes initially interpreted the First Amendment on narrow, historical grounds but later
became one of the Court's major advocates for the freedom of speech). As a result, jurists
often devise their prescription for First Amendment jurisprudence based on their understanding
of the purpose or value of the freedom of speech. See id. at § 2.01[2]. For example, Judge
Bork asserts the value of free speech is limited to its role in the democratic process; he would
grant First Amendment protection to political speech only. See REDISH, supra at 15. On the
other hand, Professor Tribe believes that the value of the freedom of speech is multifaceted and
includes, but is not limited to, personal liberty; he would protect "a rich variety of expressional
modes." TRIBE, supra at § 12-1.
36. On the question of whether commercial speech should receive the same First
Amendment protection as political speech, Justice Rehnquist asserted the First Amendment was
not intended to protect "intercourse between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to
strike a bargain." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). On the other hand, Justice Blackmun
stated that "even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to
enlighten public decision making in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of
[commercial] information does not serve that goal." Id. at 765.
37. Most jurists agree that the First Amendment forbids prior restraints--aws that require
speech to be approved by the government before publication. See Steven A. Childress, The
Empty Concept of Self-Censorship, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1969, 1972 (1996). Additionally, the
Supreme Court has held that prior restraints are highly disfavored under the First Amendment.
See id. Professor Childress proposes that "abridging speech" means "censoring speech" and
that laws penalizing speech after its dissemination are no less censorial than laws that stop
speech before its dissemination. See id. at 1969, 1975.
38. Though his First Amendment views never ruled a majority of the court, Justice Black
believed in an absolutist approach to First Amendment interpretation and was opposed to
balancing First Amendment rights with governmental interests. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH,
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of balancing tests39 and speech categories' that determines the boundaries of
our right to freedom of speech. The Court has singled out commercial speech
as a category that receives less-than-full 4' First Amendment protection.4 2 Is
minimizing the freedom of commercial speech a judicious application of the
First Amendment, or an expedient method for balancing freedom of speech

MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND His CRITICS 131-32 (1988). He said, "[tihe First Amendment does

not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law 'abridging the freedom of speech'.... It must be
taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a libertyloving society, will allow." Id. at 126 (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263
(1941)). Critics of the absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment contend that balancing
First Amendment rights with societal interests is necessary to protect against harms such as
solicitation for murder, perjury, and false advertising. See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 34, at 24-

25.
39. The Court has endorsed a "content-neutral" First Amendment principle, which forbids
the government to abridge speech based on the content, message, or viewpoint communicated.
See Daniel A. Farber, CommercialSpeech and FirstAmendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv.
372, 374 (1979). As a result, the Court ordinarily applies a demanding "strict-scrutiny" review
to content-based speech restrictions and will strike a law aimed at speech content unless it is
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Laws rarely survive strictscrutiny review. See SMOLLA, supra note 35, at § 12.01[3]. However, the Court has not
adhered consistently to the principle of content neutrality. For example, if a law curtails the
content of speech deemed to be of "low value," the Court will apply reduced scrutiny or
"categorical balancing" to determine whether the speech restriction passes constitutional muster.
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 47-48 (1987).
Additionally, when speech restrictions suppress speech for reasons not related to the content of
speech--for example, a law that prohibits loud speech beside a school zone-the Court uses one
of several standards of review ranging from rational review, which usually results in the Court
upholding the restriction, to strict scrutiny. See id. at 48-54. This is so even though a contentneutral restriction can suppress the content of speech as effectively as a content-based
restriction. See id. at 54.
40. The Court has held that the low value of commercial speech, fighting words,
pornography, and false statements justify that these speech forms receive less First Amendment
protection than political speech. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti History and
Pre-HistoryofCommercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 747, 774, n.25 (1993) (citations omitted).
Depending on the category of speech at issue, different rules apply: "Each method of
communicating ideas is a 'law unto itself' and that law must reflect the 'differing natures,
values, abuses and dangers' of each method. We deal here with the law of billboards." VAN
ALSTYNE, supra note 34, at 21 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 435 U.S. 490,
501 (1981)).
41. "Less-than-full" or "second-class" First Amendment protection results when the Court
applies a reduced level of scrutiny to a speech restriction and gives the restriction a better
chance of surviving First Amendment review. See supra note 39 for a discussion of strict and
reduced scrutiny.
42. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) ("We have not
discarded the 'common-sense' distinction between proposing a commercial transaction... and
other varieties of speech .... [C]ommercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while
allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial
expression.").
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with present day public policy?4 3 To answer this question it is necessary to
understand why the Court ousted commercial speech from the core protection
of the First Amendment. An inquiry into the history of commercial speech
jurisprudence is in order.
A.

How Commercial Speech Inherited a Second-Class Form of First
Amendment Protection

During the glory days of substantive due process, 44 plaintiffs did not
employ the First Amendment when they brought suit against a State who had
suppressed their attempts to advertise.45 Instead, these plaintiffs charged that
under the Due Process Clause, the State had impermissibly interfered with their
right to carry on a business. 46 It simply did not occur to late nineteenth and
early twentieth century litigants to characterize their advertisements as
"commercial speech" because advertising was thought of as an occupation, not
a form of expression.4 7 In fact, the first Supreme Court case that referred to
"commercial speech" was decided in 1973.48 Early decisions used the terms
"commercial activity," "commercial advertising," or "soliciting and
43. As previously mentioned, the Court has disfavored prior restraints and supported
content neutrality. See supra notes 37, 39. Additionally, most jurists agree that the First
Amendment stands for the principle that it is impermissible to suppress speech because a
majority of people think certain speech is inferior. See Kozinski, supra note 40, at 751-72.
However, the commercial speech doctrine permits prior restraints, see infra note 75, and
content-based restrictions. See supra note 42. Therefore, in order for the commercial speech
doctrine to agree with fundamental First Amendment principles, there must be a provident
reason, unrelated to majority bias, why commercial speech receives inferior First Amendment
protection. See Farber, supra note 39, at 373 n.7.
44. From 1890 to 1937, regulation of industry grew in response to the industrial
revolution. See TRIBE, supra note 35, at § 7-3. During this time, the Supreme Court reviewed
regulations with an expansive view of the Due Process Clause and interpreted it to include a
substantive right to carry on legal business without undue interference from the government.
See TRIBE, supra note 35, at § 7-3.
45. See Kozinski, supra note 40, at 760-61.
46. For example, in 1907, Nebraska prohibited a beer bottler from labeling his bottles with
the American flag and the bottler brought his claim under the Due Process Clause. See
Kozinski, supra note 40, at 763 (citing Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907)). In contrast,
a present day beer bottler--Coors Brewing Company--claimed that the government violated
the First Amendment when it prohibited the alcohol content of beer to appear on its labels. See
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S.Ct. 1585,1588 (1995).
47. See Kozinski, supra note 40, at 756-57.
48. See Kozinski, supra note 40, at 756 (noting that the Court first used the term
"commercial speech" in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 384 (1973)). See also David F. McGowan, A CriticalAnalysis of Commercial
Speech, 78 CAL. L. REv. 359, 364 (1990) (stating that the Court did not characterize
advertisements as commercial speech until its opinion in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975)).
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canvassing"-4erms that define conduct, not speech. 9 Early plaintiffs did not
use the First Amendment in their advertising suppression claims for another
reason; the First Amendment was not definitively applied to the states until
1931.50 The concept of commercial speech would take time to evolve, and the
Court would decide whether commercial speech received First Amendment
protection within the context of a future setting.
1.

The Paradoxical Origin5 of the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
Valentine v. Chrestensen 1

New Deal legislation and deference to legislatures pervaded the era in
which the Court ostensibly decided whether the First Amendment protected
commercial speech. 2 In 1942, the Court decided Valentine v. Chrestensen and
held that the Constitution did not prohibit restrictions of "commercial
advertising., 53 Mr. Chrestensen, a New York resident, owned a scrapped navy
submarine, which he displayed to the public for a fee.54 He wanted to advertise
his operation by distributing handbills in the streets, but a New York Sanitary
Code regulation deterred his advertising efforts." Chrestensen knew, despite
the sanitary code, protest material could be publicly distributed, so he printed
a protest on one side of his handbill and attempted to circulate his advertisements.16 Despite Chrestensen's efforts to comply with the law, the New York
police put a stop to his promotional efforts. In response, Chrestensen filed suit
against the police commissioner charging that the sanitary regulation violated
the Due Process Clause. 7 The United States Supreme Court found that the
49. See Kozinski, supra note 40, at 757.
50. The Court incorporated the First Amendment to the states in Stromberg v. California
and stated that "[i]t has been determined... that the conception of liberty under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech." Kozinski, supra note
40, at 760-61 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931)).
51.

316 U.S. 52 (1942).

52. "The commercial-speech doctrine is traceable to the brief opinion in Valentine v.
Chrestensen." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
384 (1973). Five years before Valentine was decided, President Roosevelt introduced a bill that
would have increased the number of Supreme Court Justices; he planned to fill the Court
vacancies with Justices who would uphold his New Deal legislation. Roosevelt's bill did not
pass, but it did cause the Supreme Court to support legislation aimed at the regulation of
commerce. See TRIBE, supra note 35, at § 8-6.
53. "We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on commercial
advertising as respects purely commercial advertising." Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54.
54. See id. at 52.
55. See id. at 53.

56. See id. Chrestensen protested the city's refusal to allow him the privilege of docking
his submarine at the city pier. See id.
57. See id. at 54. "[Chrestensen's] argument.., wasn't one thought of as resting on the
First Amendment; Mr. Chrestensen was before the Court claiming a freedom of speech
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substance of Chrestensen's printed protest amounted to an attempt to dodge the
sanitary58code, and upheld the prohibition of Chrestensen's "activity in the
streets.
In a six-paragraph opinion, the Court did not discuss commercial speech
or the First Amendment but concentrated on the commercial activity involved
and the legitimate power of the government to regulate commerce.59 Therefore,
Valentine was not a case that decided whether commercial speech should
receive First Amendment protection but did concern a pertinent issue of the
day: whether commercial conduct could be regulated by legislatures.
Even though the Court's decision in Valentine had nothing to do with the
freedom of commercial speech, its holding-4hat commercial advertising
receives no Constitutional protection--engendered the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech and affected the Court's treatment of
commercial speech in the years that followed.60
2.

The Demise of Valentine and the Dawn of First Amendment
Protectionfor Commercial Speech: Virginia6 1State Bd.of Pharmacy
v. Virginia CitizensConsumerCouncil,Inc.

After its decision in Valentine, the Court began to chisel away at the idea
that commercial advertising received no constitutional protection,62 and in
1976, the Court explicitly denounced the ouster of commercial speech from
First Amendment protection.63 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
guaranteed by substantive due process, the same doctrine that had just undergone radical
transformation." Kozinski, supra note 40, at 762.
58. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 55.
59. "Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the
streets.... are matters for legislative judgment." Id. at 54.

60. Since Valentine, "the concept of a commercial/noncommercial distinction has
remained in the law. By now it has become such a well-established part of our jurisprudence
that it is accepted almost without question." Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 628 (1990).
61. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
62. See McGowan, supra note 48, at 364-66. In Cammarano v. United States, Justice
Douglas commented that Valentine was "casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived
reflection." Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart in PittsburghPress stated: "Whatever validity the Chrestensen case may still
retain when limited to its own facts, it certainly does not stand for the proposition that the
advertising pages . . .are outside the protection given . . . by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
401 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court explained that the
ordinance in Valentine was upheld not as a regulation of speech but as a "reasonable regulation
of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed." Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809, 819 (1975).
63. See Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 762 ("Our question is whether speech [that] does 'no
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Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the Court was faced, for the first time,
with whether an advertisement, unadorned by editorial comment or political
6 The Court answered:
protest, receives protection under the First Amendment.M
65
yes.
In Virginia Board, a State regulation prohibited pharmacists from
advertising the prices of drugs. 66 Consumers of prescription drugs brought suit
against the State, charging that the advertising ban violated the First Amendment and denied them the benefit of learning the prices of drugs from
advertisements.6 7 Virginia asserted that the regulation furthered the State's
interest in the professional conduct of pharmacists and theorized that if
pharmacists advertised the prices of drugs, price wars would ensue and
pharmacists would keep prices low by cutting corners.6 8 The Court reasoned
the State had ample power to regulate its pharmacists' conduct through direct
means, and the advertising ban would not necessarily modify a pharmacist's
conduct but would work to influence consumers' decisions by keeping them
unaware of competitive drug prices. 69 The Court advised that the State could
combat the ill effects of drug price advertising by providing consumers with
more information about prescription drugs.70 Thus, the State's choice-to
curtail speech instead of directly controlling conduct or providing counter
speech-violated the First Amendment's guarantee to the freedom of speech.
more that propose a commercial transaction,' is so removed from any 'exposition of ideas,'
...
that it lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is not.") (citations omitted).
64. "Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject ....The 'idea' he
wishes to communicate is simply this: 'I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.'
Our question, then, is whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of the First
Amendment." Id. at 761.
65. See id. at 770.
66. See id. at 749-50.

67. See id. at 753 ("The plaintiffs are an individual Virginia resident who suffers from
diseases that require her to take prescription drugs on a daily basis, and two nonprofit
organizations."). On the issue of whether the plaintiffs had standing, the Court held that "[i]f
there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be
asserted by these appellees." Id. at 757.
68. See id. at 767-68. In the alternative, the state argued that advertising would inflate the
prices of prescription drugs. See id. at 768. Additionally, the state argued that advertising
would cause consumers to "shop around" and destroy the pharmacist/customer relationship.
See id.

69. "The only effect the advertising ban has on [a pharmacist likely to cut comers] is to
insulate him from price competition and to open the way for him to make a. . . profit in
addition to providing an inferior service." Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 769. "Virginia is free to
require whatever professional standards it wishes from its pharmacists ....But it may not do
so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists
are offering." Id. at 770.
70. "There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That
alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that
end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them." Id.
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Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, articulated principles on which
he based granting First Amendment protection to commercial speech. First, he
noted that the profit motivation of a speaker did not remove speech from the
protection of the First Amendment. 7' Second, he explained that the public
needed commercial information as much as, if not more than, it needed
political information.7 2 Third, Justice Blackmun posited that the success of a
democracy and a free economy required that commercial information be freely
disseminated and readily available.7 3 And finally, he asserted that the First
flow of commerAmendment prohibited the government from preventing 7the
4
decisions.
public's
the
affect
to
order
in
cial information
After granting commercial speech First Amendment protection, the Court
left a loophole for its suppression. In footnote twenty-four, the Court noted
that "commonsense differences" between commercial and noncommercial
speech made commercial speech more regulable. 75 Although the Court
acknowledged that commercial speech may allow more regulation than other
speech, it did so on the premise that regulation would further the interest of
truthful commercial information.7 6 Indeed, the Court noted that the law
provides no protection for any form of false speech.77

71. See id. at 762.
72. See id. at 763.
73. See id. at 765.
74. See id. at 770.
75. See Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24. The Court reasoned that the "greater
objectivity" and "greater hardiness" of commercial speech provided "commonsense
distinctions" that "may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of
silencing the speaker." Id. The Court concluded that commercial speech had greater objectivity
because "the truth of commercial speech. . . may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator
Id. And greater hardiness "since
than ... news reporting or political commentary .....
advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being
chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely." Id. Additionally, the Court posited that
the commonsense differences justified requiring commercial speech to "appear in such a form,
or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent
its being deceptive." Id. The Court also noted that the commonsense differences "may also
make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints." Id.
76. "[A] different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and
legitimate commercial information is unimpaired." Id.
77. "Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own
sake." Id. at 771 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418. U.S. 340 (1974)).
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The Wearing Away of Virginia Board: Subsequent Cases Give
Truthful Commercial Speech Less-Than-Full First Amendment
Protection

The Court's decision in Virginia Board gave commercial speech First
Amendment protection and, arguably, gave truthful commercial speech full
First Amendment protection.7 8 However, in cases that followed Virginia
Board, the Court drew on the "commonsense differences" set out in footnote
twenty-four to defend affording commercial speech second-class First
Amendment protection.
In Bates v. State Bar ofArizona,79 the Court rejected the application of the
overbreadth doctrine" to commercial speech restrictions and used the
commonsense differences for support.81 Bates, an attorney, advertised his legal
services in violation of the State's complete ban on attorney advertising. 2 The
Court noted that if the ban had restricted non-commercial speech, the
overbreadth doctrine would apply and the Court would declare the ban
unconstitutional on its face.83 But because the speech in question was
commercial, the Court narrowed its inquiry to whether the advertising ban
unconstitutionally abridged Bates's specific speech. 4 The Court held that the
State's suppression of Bates's commercial speech violated the First Amendment. 85
In Ohralikv. Ohio State BarAssociation,6the Court held that commercial
speech received less-than-full First Amendment protection and fortified its
holding with the commonsense differences rationale.8 7 Additionally, the
Ohralik Court warned that if commercial speech were granted full First
Amendment protection, the protection granted to other forms of speech would
78. See McGowan, supra note 48, at 368.

79. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
80. Ordinarily, a plaintiff cannot attack the constitutionality of a law unless that law
directly violates the constitutional rights of the plaintiff bringing suit. See id. at 380. However,
the overbreadth doctrine, as it applies to freedom of speech cases, allows a plaintiff to challenge
a speech restriction without showing that the restriction directly violates the rights of the
particular plaintiff before the court. See id. The overbreath doctrine operates when a law has
the potential of causing non-litigants to avoid engaging in protected speech for fear that their
speech would be punished under an overbroad statute. See id.
81. The Court did not question the logic behind the "commonsense differences" but
simply stated that "it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being
crushed by overbroad regulation." Id. at 381.
82. See id. at 354-55.
83. See id. at 379-80.
84. See id. at 381.
85. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 382.

86. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
87. See supra note 42.
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be diluted and the First Amendment would be "devitalized.""8 Ohralik
involved the aggressive solicitation tactics of an attorney who visited a
potential client while she was hospitalized.8 9 Arguably, it was unnecessary for
the Court to decide the case by limiting the protection of commercial speech;
the Court could have decided the case by limiting its holding to the fact that the
State had ample authority to discipline an attorney for overreaching conduct,
not speech. 90
4.

Protectionfor CommercialSpeech Articulated in a Balancing Test:
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service
Commission9'

In CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
the Court held that a New York regulation that banned public utility advertising
violated the freedom of speech.92 The government argued that its regulation
served the interest of energy conservation because the utility's advertisements
would increase the demand for electricity and lead to more consumption. 93 In
order to make its decision, the Court devised a four-prong test to determine
whether the regulation could be upheld under the First Amendment. The
Central Hudson test is as follows: first, commercial speech receives no
protection if it is false, misleading, or concerns an illegal activity; second, the
government must assert a substantial interest in order to restrict speech; third,
the speech restriction must directly advance the government's interest; and
fourth, the speech restriction must be no more extensive than necessary. 94
In applying the test to New York's advertising ban, the Court accepted,
without requiring empirical proof, that the advertising ban would lower
consumption and, therefore, directly advance the State's interest. 95 However,
88. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456. In reaction to the Court's proposition that protecting
commercial speech would decrease protection for other forms of speech, Judge Kozinski
asserted, "[T]he opposite is true. Protecting commercial speech less than noncommercial
speech leads exactly to what you would think-not enough protection for speech implicating
economic concerns." Kozinski, supra note 40, at 648.
89. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 449.
90. See McGowan, supra note 48, at 370. In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall
noted that "[w]hat is objectionable about Ohralik's behavior here is not so much that he
solicited business for himself, but rather the circumstances in which he performed that
solicitation and the means by which he accomplished it."' Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
91. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
92. See id. at 572.

93. See id. at 568. The government also argued that increasing the demand for electricity
would increase the cost of supplying electricity and result in higher rates to consumers. See id.
568-69.
94. See id. at 566.
95. See id. at 569.
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the Court found that the ban failed the fourth requirement because the State
could achieve its goal by requiring that the utility include in its advertisements
information regarding energy conservation."
Therefore, New York's
advertisement ban failed the CentralHudson test.97
In devising the Central Hudson test, the Court called upon the commonsense differences9" to support giving commercial speech restrictions an
intermediate level of judicial review. 99 On the other hand, the Court professed
disapproval of paternalistic speech bans that advance a governmental interest
by keeping information from the public."°° Could the Court's new balancing
test give commercial speech reduced protection and guard against paternalistic
speech regulations? CentralHudson's criteria would be put to the test in the
years that followed.
5.

The Application and Manipulationof CentralHudson

Six years after constructing the CentralHudson test, the Court applied it
to a Puerto Rico statute that forbade the island's casinos from advertising to
Puerto Rican residents; the casinos were permitted to advertise to tourists. 101
Puerto Rico asserted that it enacted the statute in the interest of reducing the
gambling activities of the Puerto Rican public.' 0 2 The Commonwealth
maintained that if casino advertisements were kept from the public, the demand
for gambling would fall. 103
In applying the CentralHudson test to Puerto Rico's statute, the Court
readily accepted the theory that an advertisement ban would directly advance
the legislature's interest in reducing gambling.'" 4 Additionally, the Court held
96. See id. at 571. Additionally, the Court noted that the first and second prongs of its test
were satisfied because the utility's advertisements did not concern illegal activity or deceptive
advertising, and the State's interest in energy conservation was substantial. See id. at 566, 568.
97. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 568.
98. See id. at 562.

99. "The CentralHudson commercial speech test is less rigorous than the "strict scrutiny"
level of judicial review normally applied in content-based regulation of speech." SMOLLA,
supra note 35, at § 12.01[3]. "The test for commercial speech differs from strict scrutiny in two
ways. First, the regulation need not be justified by a 'compelling' governmental interest; a
'substantial' interest will suffice. Second.... the means employed by the government need not
be the 'least restrictive' method of achieving its objective." SMOLLA, supra note 35, at §
12.01[3].
100. See CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 562.

101.

See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340-41 (1986).

102.
103.

See id. at 34 1.
See id. at 342.

104. See id. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, did not require the state to submit
empirical evidence that the advertising ban would be effective. He commented, "[w]e think the
legislature's belief is a reasonable one, and the fact that the appellant has chosen to litigate this

1997]

COMMERCIAL SPEECH

that the statute passed the fourth prong of Central Hudson, 5 because the
legislature had latitude in choosing between a restriction of commercial speech
or more direct means of furthering its interest."°
Although the Court determined that Puerto Rico's statute passed the
Central Hudson test, it went on to reinforce its holding under alternative
theories. First, the Court asserted that the greater power to forbid gambling
encompassed the lesser power to forbid the advertising of gambling.'0 7
Additionally, the Court implied that the legislature had enhanced power to
suppress commercial speech when the speech concerned "vice" products or
activities.'0
Nine years after deciding Posadas,the Court relaxed the fourth prong of
the CentralHudson test in Board of Trustees v. Fox.'0 9 The Fox Court held
that a commercial speech restriction would pass the fourth prong as long as the
governmental interest at stake counterbalanced the imposition on commercial
speech. Even if the government could achieve its goals without suppressing
speech, a reasonable burden on commercial speech would pass First Amendment review.' 10
B.

CentralHudson Strengthened: Virginia BoardPrinciples Reappear

In Edenfield v. Fane," the Court invalidated a Florida statute that
prohibited certified public accountants from soliciting new clients in person." 2
Florida asserted the statute protected consumers from fraud and helped to
case... indicates that the appellant shares the legislature's view." Id.
105. See supra text accompanying note 94 for a discussion of the Central Hudson test.
106. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344. Justice Rehnquist opined that the legislature could
reason that even if the residents of Puerto Rico were told that gambling was bad for them, they
would do it anyway. See id.
107. See id. at 345-46.
108.. See id. at 346.
109. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). In Fox, students of the State University of New York held a
Tupperware party in violation of a school resolution that forbade commercial enterprises to
operate on campus. See id. at 471-72. The government asserted the resolution furthered its
interest in "promoting an educational rather than commercial atmosphere on ...campuses."
Id. at 475. The students claimed that the resolution violated their right to free speech and that
the Tupperware party involved both commercial and "pure speech" about fiscal responsibility
and operating an efficient household. See id. at 474. The Court rejected the theory that the
speech at issue was partially pure speech and decided the case under Central Hudson standards.
See id. at 474-75.
110. See id. at 480 ("What our decisions require is a 'fit' between the legislature's ends and
the means chosen to accomplish those ends.... a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is 'in
proportion to the interest served'.... ) (citations omitted).
Ill. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
112. Seeid. at 763.
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maintain the certified public accountants'
independence in auditing the
3
clients."
their
of
records
financial
The Edenfield Court changed the third prong of the CentralHudson test,
which resulted in a more stringent review for Florida's solicitation restrictions.
Specifically, the Court required the State to prove that the commercial speech
restriction would remedy an "actual" harm to a "material" degree." 4 Thus, the
Court refashioned the third prong of the CentralHudson test to serve as a
check on the second prong." 5 The Court explained that the proof it required
was necessary to prevent a State from claiming that a speech restriction served
a legitimate end, while
covertly serving an end that would never pass First
6
review."
Amendment
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.," 7 the Court strengthened the fourth prong
of the Central Hudson test and struck down a federal law that forbade the
printing of alcohol content on beer labels." 8 The government claimed that the
speech restriction advanced its interest in preventing "strength wars" between
brewers who would otherwise increase the alcohol content of beer in order to
attract more customers.' '9 In applying the CentralHudson test, the Court used20
its "new and improved" version of the third prong as set out in Edenfield1
The Court found that the government's speech restriction did not materially
advance its interest in preventing strength wars because the regulation allowed
alcohol content to be advertised through media other than labels.' 2 ' Additionally, the Court held that the regulation failed the fourth prong of Central
Hudson because the State could have used means less burdensome to
commercial speech.' 22 Thus, the Rubin Court's version of the fourth prong of
CentralHudson was stronger than what the Court had prescribed in Fox--that
the speech restriction need23be only reasonable and that the legislature's choice
would receive deference. 1
113. Seeid.at 768.
114. "[The third prong of Central Hudson] is not satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech
must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate
them to a material degree." Id. at 770-71.
115. The second prong of CentralHudson, as originally written, required the government
assert a substantial interest, and the third prong required the government's speech restriction
directly advance the asserted interest. See text accompanying note 97.
116. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

115 S.Ct. 1585 (1995).
See id. at 1594.
See id. at 1588.
See id. at 1591-93.
See id. at 1592.

122. See id. at 1593-94.
123. For a discussion of Fox, see supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.

1997]

COMMERCIAL SPEECH

In Edenfield and Rubin, the Court used the CentralHudson test in name
only. In substance, the Court altered the test to the extent of providing truthful
commercial speech the protection called for in Virginia Board. However, in
order for strong protection for commercial speech to endure, the Court would
have to ground its commercial speech doctrine in solid First Amendment
principles, rather than the happenstance of the CentralHudson test.
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In a unanimous judgment, the United States Supreme Court held that
Rhode Island's advertising ban silenced commercial speech in violation of the
First Amendment.1 24 Additionally, the Court held that the Twenty-first
Amendment did not enable Rhode Island to make laws restricting freedom of
speech protected under the First Amendment. 125 While the Court was united
in its judgment, it was divided in its reasoning. The Court's analysis of First
Amendment review, as it applies to commercial speech, was a tangled array of
26
plurality opinions and partial concurrences. 1
A.

The Principal Plurality Opinion

Justice Stevens began his substantive discussion in part three of the
principal eight-part plurality opinion. 127 First, he reviewed the history of
American advertising 2' and summarized the evolution of commercial speech
jurisprudence. 29 Through his historical review, Justice Stevens developed a
principle that guided the remainder of the opinion. That principle was as
124. See44Liquornart, 116 S. Ct. at 1515.
125. See id. at 1514-15.
126. Justice Stevens wrote the eight-part principal, plurality opinion. See id. at 1501-15.
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens in parts one,
two, and seven of the principal opinion. See id. at 1501-04, 1514-15. Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens in part eight of the principal opinion. See id. at
1515. Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburgjoined Justice Stevens in parts three and five of
the principal opinion. See id. at 1504-07, 1508-10. Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg
joined Justice Stevens in part six of the principal opinion. See id. at 1510-14. Justices Kennedy
and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens in part four of the principal opinion. See id. at 1507-08.
Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. See id. at
1515 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. See id. at 1515-20 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer, wrote an opinion
concurring in the judgment. See id. at 1520-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127. See id. at 1501-15.
128. Justice Stevens noted: "Even in colonial days, the public relied on 'commercial
speech' for vital information about the market." Id. at 1504.
129. See id. at 1504-07.
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follows: The objective of commercial speech jurisprudence is to advance the
consumers' interest in receiving factual, undistorted information so that they
may make well-informed economic decisions. 30 This principle, he emphasized, is the primary reason states have latitude in enacting commercial speech
regulations that protect consumers from false advertising.13' This principle, he
noted, is the reason a state cannot justify censoring truthful commercial speech
in order to protect its citizenry from making decisions the state fears will be
unwise. 132 This principle, he made clear,
is the reason the First Amendment
33
protects truthful commercial speech.
After establishing consumer advocacy as the core objective of commercial
speech jurisprudence, Justice Stevens addressed the issue of constitutional
review.1 34 He asserted that when a commercial speech regulation blocks all
avenues for imparting truthful information and promotes an interest separate
from fair dealing in the marketplace, "special care" should be taken when

reviewing the regulation. 135

In part four, Justice Stevens advanced the rationale for reviewing
commercial speech bans with special care. 136 A complete ban of truthful
130. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1504-07. Justice Stevens noted: "In accord with the
role that commercial messages have long played, the law has developed to ensure that
advertising provides consumers with accurate information about the availability of goods and
services." Id. at 1504.
131. See id. at 1505-07. Justice Stevens recognized that some types of commercial speech
may be regulated more freely than other forms of commercial speech. See id. at 1505.
"Specifically,... the State may require commercial messages to 'appear in such a form, or
include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its
being deceptive.' " Id. at 1505-06 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772, n.24 (1976)).
132. See id. at 1505 (.'There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume. .,.people will perceive their own best interests if only
they are well enough informed ...')(quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
133. See id. at 1505 ("[T]he public's interest in receiving accurate commercial information
also supports an interpretation of the First Amendment that provides constitutional protection
for the dissemination of accurate and nonmisleading commercial messages.").
134. See id. at 1507.
135. See id. The source for Justice Stevens's special care review is found in Central
Hudson which states: "We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress
commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy. ....
Indeed, in recent years
this Court has not approved a blanket ban on commercial speech unless the expression itself is
flawed in some way ....
" Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980). In CentralHudson, the special care language may have referred to
the test set out and applied in the Court's decision. However, Justice Stevens implied that
special care review is stricter than the Central Hudson test itself. See infra note 139.
136. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507-08. Justice Stevens began part four by
proposing that there is more than one way to review a commercial speech regulation. See id.
Because the Central Hudson test had governed review of commercial speech regulations from
1980 up to the time of his opinion in 44 Liquormart, Justice Stevens proposed applying a
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commercial speech, he warned, with a goal unrelated to consumer advocacy,
could serve as a subterfuge to hide the government's primary goal and prevent
enlightened public debate.1 7 Additionally, Justice Stevens noted that the
factual speech censored by Rhode Island's ban on price advertisement lacked
the qualities of commercial speech that, in some instances, justify reviewing
commercial speech regulations with added deference.'38
In attempting to fix the limits of special care review, Justice Stevens
indicated that it should be more demanding than the CentralHudson test, and
hinted that it should be equivalent to full-strength First Amendment review.'39
However, he stopped short of declaring that truthful commercial speech is
entitled to full First Amendment protection.
In part five of the opinion, the Justice Stevens applied a "special care"
version of the CentralHudson test to Rhode Island's advertisement ban. 40
First, he addressed the third prong of CentralHudson: does the regulation
directly advance the State's interest?' 4' Justice Stevens noted that under the
general test set out in CentralHudson, a State must show that its regulation
advances the asserted interest to a "material" degree. 42 However, in this case,
where the regulation muzzled factual information, he required that Rhode
Island prove its ban advanced the State's interest in temperance to a "significant" degree.143 Justice Stevens found no evidence to support a conclusion that
the advertising ban would decrease alcohol consumption to an extent that
would significantly advance the State's interest in promoting temperance.'"
stricter review than set out in Central Hudson. See id.
137. See id. at 1508 ("The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their
own good.").
138. See id. at 1507-08. Justice Stevens explained that the "commonsense distinctions"
between commercial and noncommercial speech, set out in Virginia Pharmacy, do not justify
a complete ban on truthful information. See id. For a discussion of the commonsense
distinctions see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
139. Justice Stevens explained:
"When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers... the
purpose of its regulation... justifies less than strict review. However, when
a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful . . . commercial
messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining
process, there is far less reason to depart form the rigorous review that the
First Amendment generally demands."
44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507.

140. See id. at 1508-10.
141. See id. at 1509-10.
142. See id. at 1509.
143. Id. (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771).
144. See id. at 1509. Justice Stevens accepted Rhode Island's theory that dampening price
competition would tend to keep prices higher and compared the State's scheme to a "collusive
agreement among competitors" to keep prices high. See id. Justice Stevens concluded,
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Furthermore, he found that marginally higher prices would probably have no
effect on the
level of alcohol consumption among certain groups of
45
consumers. 1
Next, Justice Stevens addressed the fourth prong of CentralHudson: is
the regulation more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted state
interest?'46 While he did not articulate the standard to be applied to the fourth
prong of the CentralHudson test in cases that merit special care review, Justice
Stevens concluded that Rhode Island's advertising ban fell short of passing the
"reasonable fit" standard generally required under Central Hudson. 47 He
asserted that Rhode Island could use more direct means to achieve temperance
that would not suppress commercial speech. 41 8 Specifically, he suggested, the
State could increase taxes on liquor, limit purchases of liquor, or implement
educational campaigns. 149
In part six of the principal opinion, Justice Stevens addressed arguments
asserted by Rhode Island, which were based in large part on the Court's
decision in Posadas.'50 First, Rhode Island argued that, in keeping with
Posadas, the State's legislature was entitled to promote temperance by
choosing an advertisement ban over alternative methods, especially when
evidence of whether the ban would be effective was inconclusive.' 5' Justice
Stevens criticized Posadasas an anomaly 52 and asserted that when suppression
of truthful commercial speech indirectly promotes public policy, the policy is
hidden from the public eye and is removed from public debate. 5 3 In conclusion, he maintained that the First Amendment, not Rhode Island's legislature,
54
was the authority to be consulted when deciding whether to suppress speech.
however, that "without any findings of fact, or indeed any evidentiary support whatsoever, we
cannot agree with the assertion that the price advertising ban will significantly advance the
State's interest inpromoting temperance." Id.
145. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1509. In its brief to the Court, the State defined its
interest in promoting temperance as "an interest in reducing alcohol consumption among all
drinkers." Id. n.14 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens noted that "evidence suggests that the
abusive drinker will probably not be deterred by a marginal price increase .. " Id. at 1510.

146. See id. at 1510.
147.
148.
149.

See id.
See id.
See id.

150. See id. at 1510-14. The arguments asserted were based in large part on the Court's
decision in Posadasde Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986). For a

discussion of Posadas,see supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
151. See44Liquormart,116S.Ct.atl5ll-12.

152. See id. at 1511 ("Because the [five]-to-[four] decision in Posadas marked such a sharp
break from our prior precedent, . . .we decline to give force to its highly deferential
approach.").
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1511 ("[W]e conclude that a state legislature does not have the broad
discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes that the
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Next, Justice Stevens addressed Rhode Island's claim that the State's
"greater" authority to ban the sale of liquor encompassed the State's "lesser"
authority to ban the advertisement of liquor prices.'55 He contended that the
opposite is true-that the State's power to suppress speech is far more onerous
than the its power to regulate conduct by banning the sale of liquor.'56 The
thrust of Justice Steven's response was that, under the First Amendment,
preventing citizens from learning and communicating about an activity
abridges freedom more than preventing citizenry from participating in that
activity. Furthermore, citizens should not be made to forgo a constitutional
right in order to receive a service or benefit from their government.'57 Justice
Stevens concluded that because Rhode Island had the power to ban liquor sales,
it did not follow that Rhode Island had an incidental power to ban the
advertisement of liquor prices. 5 '
Finally, Justice Stevens addressed Rhode Island's argument that the Court
should uphold the State's advertising ban because the ban regulates a "vice"
activity. 5 9 He made short work rejecting the "vice" argument by pointing out
the practical problems it would create."6 Who would be the arbiter to decide
what constitutes a purported vice?'16 Would legislatures simply censor
162
commercial speech according to their own subjective definition of vice?
Would the federal courts develop a common law of vice?' 63 Would eating too
much red meat constitute a vice?"

Posadasmajority was willing to tolerate.").
155. See id. at 1512. This "greater-includes-the-lesser" reasoning was embraced in
Posadas.See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, distinguished constitutionally protected conduct (abortions) from conduct that could be
prohibited by the states (gambling). He reasoned that if a state could completely ban conduct,
it could likewise ban advertising concerning the conduct. See Posadas,478 U.S. at 345-55.
156. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1512 ("[W]e fail to see how ... the State's power to
regulate commercial activity is 'greater' than its power to ban truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech.").
157. See id. at 1513.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 1513. Rhode Island based its "vice" distinction argument on the Court's

opinion in Posadasand Edge, which both dealt with commercial speech regulations affecting
gambling. See id. at 1513. However, in Rubin v. Coors, the Court stated that the holdings in
Posadas and Edge depended on application of CentralHudson test, not a "vice" distinction.
See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1589 n.2 (1995).
160. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1513-14.
161. See id. at 1513.
162. See id.
163. See id.

164. See id. Justice Stevens cautioned: "Almost any product that poses some threat to
public health or public morals might reasonably be characterized by a state legislature as
relating to a 'vice activity."' Id. at 1513.
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In part seven of the principal opinion, six members of the Court held that
the Twenty-first Amendment did not bolster Rhode Island's ban on commercial
speech.'65 The Court recognized that the Twenty-first Amendment gives the
States ample commerce power over alcoholic beverages' 66 but concluded that
such power67 must be exercised in compliance with other constitutional
provisions. 1
B.

Justice Scalia's Concurrence

Justice Scalia, writing individually, disclosed a lack of fondness for the
CentralHudson test 6 and paternalistic state laws that keep information from
the public. 169 However, he contended that the Court would be paternalistic if
it prohibited states from enacting laws unless the Constitution directed the
Court to do so. 70 According to Justice Scalia, evidence of what the First
Amendment mandates regarding commercial speech is supplied by America's
past.' 7' Consequently, he would not replace the Central Hudson test for a
stricter review unless historical evidence showed that the First Amendment was
intended to protect commercial speech.172 Specifically, he required evidence
that the American people long have held freedom of commercial speech to be
a fundamental liberty. 173 More specifically, he required evidence that state
legislatures have long recognized freedom of commercial speech as a
fundamental liberty. 7 4 In 44 Liquormart,the parties before the Court did not
165. See id. at 1514-15.
166. See 44 Liquormart, 116 U.S. at 1514. "As is clear, the text of the Twenty-first
Amendment supports the view that, while it grants the States authority over commerce that
might otherwise be reserved to the Federal Government, it places no limit whatsoever on other
constitutional provisions." Id.
167. See id. at 1514-15. The Court reviewed its prior holdings that the Twenty-first
Amendment did not diminish the force of the Supremacy Clause, the Establishment Clause, or
the Equal Protection Clause. See id.
168. See id. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I share Justice Thomas's discomfort with the
Central Hudson test, which seems to me to have nothing more than policy intuition to support
it.").
169. See id. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("1 also share Justice Stevens's aversion towards
paternalistic governmental policies that prevent men and women from hearing facts that might
not be good for them.").
170. See id. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[lt would also be paternalism for us to
prevent the people of the States from enacting laws that we consider paternalistic, unless we
have good reason to believe that the Constitution itself forbids them.").
171.. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
172. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I will take my guidance as to what the Constitution
forbids ... from the long accepted practices of the American People.").
174. See id. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that state legislative
practices before adoption of the First Amendment and after the adoption of the Fourteenth
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provide Justice Scalia with the evidence he required; therefore, he declined
17 5
joining Justice Stevens in his pursuit of a new special care review.
C.

Justice Thomas's Concurrence

Justice Thomas, writing individually, argued that when a government
regulation works to keep information from the public in order to control the
public's choices, the Central Hudson test is inapplicable.'
Instead, he
insisted, regulations that keep citizens ignorant in order to control their
behavior, should categorically be deemed illegitimate.' 77
Throughout his concurrence, Justice Thomas adhered to the principles of
VirginiaPharmacy7 ' which determined that a democracy and a free enterprise
economy require well-informed citizens free to make independent decisions, 17 9
1 80
and that the First Amendment protects the circulation of commercial speech.
He rejected the aftermath of CentralHudson--that regulations which suppress
information are permissible as long as they pass a balancing test,'' and that
commercial speech receives a second-class form of First Amendment
protection. 182

Amendment would be most relevant because "it is most improbable" that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments were "meant to overturn any existing national consensus regarding
free speech." Id. at 151!5 (Scalia, J., concurring).
175. See id. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring).
176. See id. at 1515-16 (Thomas, J. concurring). By definition, Justice Thomas asserted
that the CentralHudson test was an inappropriate review for Rhode Island's regulation and the
regulation reviewed in CentralHudson itself This is because the regulation at issue in Central
Hudson prohibited electric utilities from advertising in order to keep low the demand for
electricity, i.e., the regulation worked to keep information from people in order to affect their
conduct. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 558-61
(1980).
177. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1515-16 (Thomas, J. concurring).
178. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
179. See 44 Liquormart, 16 S. Ct. at 1516 (Thomas, J. concurring).
180. See id. (Thomas, J. concurring).
181. See id. at 1517 (Thomas, J. concurring) ("[T]he Court has appeared to accept the
legitimacy of laws that suppress information in order to manipulate the choices of
consumers
o long as the government could show that the manipulation was successful.
Central Hudson (citation omitted) was the first decision to clearly embrace this position
.... )oH
182. See id. at 1517 (Thomas, J. concurring). Justice Thomas noted that the Central
Hudson opinion assumed that commercial speech was of "less constitutional moment" than
other forms of protected speech. Id. at 1517-18 (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 n.5 (1980)).
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Justice Thomas's Prediction: Return to Virginia Board

Additionally, Justice Thomas observed that the Court's present version of
the fourth prong8 3 of Central Hudson, if faithfully applied to future cases,
would dramatically affect commercial speech jurisprudence.' The effect, he
predicted, would be that restrictions on commercial speech would rarely, if
ever, pass constitutional scrutiny. 185 He explained that, in the present case,
Rhode Island's ban failed the fourth prong because the Court found more direct
ways to promote temperance which did not infringe on commercial speech.'86
He reasoned that in future cases, there would almost always be a speech-neutral
alternative available to advance a state's interest.'8 7
Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded that the Court's application of
CentralHudson's fourth prong swallowed the CentralHudson test.'88 In his
view, the Court's application of the Central Hudson test in 44 Liquormart
amounted to following the principle in VirginiaBoard; attempts to manipulate
consumer's choices
by keeping them ignorant are impermissible under the First
89
1
Amendment.
E.

Justice O'Connor's Concurrence

Justice O'Connor relied on the fourth prong of the traditional Central
Hudson analysis to conclude that Rhode Island's ban violated the First
Amendment.'" According to Justice O'Connor, it was clear that the State
could easily keep liquor prices higher without trespassing on the freedom of

183. The fourth prong of Central Hudson inquires whether the government regulation is
more extensive than necessary to achieve the asserted governmental interest. See id. at 1510.
184. See id. at 1518-20 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Stevens plurality found that under
the fourth prong of Central Hudson, Rhode Island's ban was more extensive than necessary
because the State could have advanced temperance more directly without suppressing speech.
See id. at 1510. Similarly, the O'Connor plurality found "the regulation imposes too great..
• a prohibition on speech .... The State has other methods at its disposal ... methods that
would more directly accomplish this stated goal .... " Id. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
185. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1518-20 (Thomas, J., concurring).
186. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).

187. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
188. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
189. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
190. See id. at 1520-23 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
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commercial speech. 91 As a result, she did not think it was necessary to discard
or alter the CentralHudson test.' 92
Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Stevens's view that Posadaswas
overly deferential to Puerto Rico's legislature. 3 She noted that, since
Posadas, the Court has scrutinized more closely the State's proffer that
commercial speech restrictions directly advance the State's asserted interest.194
Additionally, Justice O'Connor concluded that the Twenty-first Amendment
had no role to play in First Amendment review of commercial speech
restrictions. 19"
V. SIGNIFICANCE

Before the Court's decision in 44 Liquormart,the CentralHudson test
sanctioned the suppression of truthful commercial speech.96 After the Court's
decision, government may no longer manipulate the marketplace by suppressing truthful speech about a legal product when speech-neutral alternatives can
further the government's goals.'97 If government wants to influence citizens'
choices, it must do so openly and honestly. Only then will the people know the
policy behind government action; only then can the people hold their
government politically accountable for what it does. 198

191. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1521-22 (O'Connor, J. concurring). Justice
O'Connor, like Justice Stevens, proposed that a liquor tax, purchase limit, or educational
campaigns would serve the State's interest without burdening commercial speech. See id. at
1522 (O'Connor, J. concurring).

192. See id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
193. See id. (O'Connor, J. concurring) (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism
Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986)).
194. See id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J. concurring)
Since Posadas, however, this Court has examined more searchingly the State's
professed goal, and the speech restriction put into place to further it, before
accepting a State's claim that the speech restriction satisfies First Amendment
scrutiny... we declined to accept at face value the profferred justification.., but
examined carefully the relationship between the asserted goal and the speech
restriction used to reach that goal.
Id. (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 1523 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
196. See supra section 111.A.4-5.
197. Both the Stevens and O'Connor pluralities found that Rhode Island's advertisement
ban violated the First Amendment because the State's interest in temperance could have been
achieved by more direct control over conduct or educational campaigns. See supra sections
IV.A. & D.
198. The Stevens plurality, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas denounced paternalistic
speech restrictions that hide public policy from citizenry. See supra section IV.A-D.
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The Justices disagreed about the type of constitutional review to apply to
commercial speech restrictions.'" However, as Justice Thomas noted, no
matter what the label, the First Amendment review applied in 44 Liquormart
will always result in invalidating a law that curtails truthful commercial speech
unless the government cannot further its goals through non-speech restrictive
means. 200

While the Court took a big step toward strengthening the freedom of
commercial speech in 44 Liquormart,the speech at issue contained verifiable
information; but not all commercial speech can be proven true or false.2 °1
Some advertisements simply assert the opinion that product A is superior to
product B. Others, without saying a word, engage the consumer's desire to
possess a particular image or lifestyle.20 2 For example, a tee shirt emblazoned
with Joe Camel does not provide us with facts, but suggests, "Smoking Camels
will give you a cool persona." Does this type of commercial speech receive
First Amendment protection? We may condemn the ideas Joe Camel conveys;
but we cannot prove them to be false statements, and the First Amendment
protects ideas even when the majority finds them reprehensible.2 3
The Food and Drug Administration has issued regulations that severely
limit public appearances of Joe Camel and company hoping to reduce smoking
among children and adolescents. 2° The regulations limit cigarette advertise20 5
ments viewable by children to black and white text with no pictures or logos.

Additionally, the FDA prohibits the sale of caps and tee shirts that identify a

199. Five Justices advocated "special care" or strict review. See supra notes 140-45 and
accompanying text. Justice Scalia and the O'Connor plurality used the CentralHudson test.
See supra text accompanying notes 175, 192.
200. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1519 (Thomas, J., concurring).
201. See McGowan, supra note 48, at 416-21 (distinguishing between informational and

persuasive commercial speech).
202. See McGowan, supra note 48 at 411-12.
203. See Kozinski, supra note 40, at 751-72.

204. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 21 CFR pts. 801-04, 807, 820, 897

(1996).
On June 25, 1997, attention turned from the FDA regulations to a proposed settlement
between tobacco companies and the attorneys general of forty states, which would severely
restrict cigarette advertisements. Richard Sloane, Detailsof the Tobacco Industry 's Settlement,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 19, 1997, at 4. Congress must implement the settlement through legislation
before it can become law. Id. Professor Laurence Tribe "questioned any attempt to write the
ad restrictions in the agreement into law, and said they are less likely to withstand judicial
scrutiny than the Internet decency law already overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court." Ira
Teinowitz, Tobacco Settlement Seen HeadedInto Next Year: Slow Going in Congress Turns
Spotlight Back to Court Battle Over FDA Regs, ADVERTISING AGE, July 21, 1997, at 34.
205. See id.
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cigarette brand.2 °6 Thus, the regulations curtail both informational and Joe
Camel-like cigarette advertisements.
It is unlikely the FDA's speech regulations will pass First Amendment
review for the following reasons. First, cigarette advertisements concern a
legal activity-selling cigarettes to adults. 2 7 Therefore, under 44 Liquormart,
the FDA may not curtail truthful, informative cigarette advertisements when
it can further its goals through control of cigarette sales and educational antismoking campaigns. Second, the well-established maxim that the First
Amendment protects ideas and opinions requires that cigarette advertisements
that are non-informative but represent ideas or opinions receive First Amendment protection. 2 8 Third, the FDA's regulations present a classic example of
paternalistic speech restrictions, which were condemned in 44 Liquormart.
one time
And finally, 44 Liquormartrejected the "vice" distinction, which at
20 9
regulations.
FDA's
the
of
constitutionality
the
bolstered
have
may
Another question regarding commercial speech remains unresolved--how
do we distinguish commercial speech from other speech forms when they are
mixed? The New York State Liquor Authority banned the sale of "Bad Frog"
beer within its borders because it found the beer's label offensive and
ungrammatical.21 0 Bad Frog's label displays a frog shamelessly extending its
middle finger to the viewer with a slogan that reads, "He just don't care; the
beer so good ... it's bad. 21 The manufacturer of Bad Frog filed suit in
206. See id.
207. Cigarette advertisements reach adults and children, and because selling cigarettes to
children is illegal, the FDA may argue that its regulations address an illegal activity that is
unprotected by the First Amendment. Presumably, cigarette advertisements concern an illegal
activity only if the advertisements are directed toward selling cigarettes to children, and the
FDA would have difficulty proving that cigarette companies intentionally reach out to children
and adolescents through advertisements. Additionally, the Court has held that it will not reduce
the freedom of speech to that which is suitable for children. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (striking down a ban on direct mailings that advertised
contraceptives). On June 26, 1997, the Court invalidated the Communications Decency Act and
restated that the interest in protecting children "does not justify an unnecessarily broad
suppression of speech addressed to adults. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997).
208. "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges
and juries but on the competition of other ideas." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
339-40 (1974).
209. "[A] 'vice' label that is unaccompanied by a corresponding prohibition against the
commercial behavior at issue fails to provide a principled justification for the regulation of
commercial speech about that activity." 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1513-14.
210. The liquor authority claimed the label "'expresses a disrespect and flippant attitude,
rejecting propreity and proper English."' Jay Gallagher, Bad Frog Brewery Suing to Overturn
New York Ban, Gannett News Service, October 22, 1996 (quoting the New York Liquor
Authority). "New York isn't alone in trying to keep Bad Frog beer... off store shelves. Ohio,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania also turned thumbs down." Id.
211. Id.
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federal court, charging that the ban violated the First Amendment.2 12 Is Bad
Frog's speech commercial, profane, or both? The answer could determine the
outcome of the case.21 3
Undoubtedly, the lines between speech categories are sometimes hard to
see, and as long as different classes of speech receive varying levels of
protection, First Amendment jurisprudence will continue to be a puzzling and
unpredictable area of constitutional law.214 But the Court's decision in 44
Liquormartcleared away some of the confusion and brought to our attention
that when the freedom of speech is devalued, an opportunity exists for our
government to do much more than abridge speech. If lawmakers were perfect,
we would not need the Constitution or its First Amendment. 1
Jo-Jo Baldwin

212. See Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., No..96-CV-1668(FJS),
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18068, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying Bad Frog Brewery a
preliminary injunction that would have allowed the sale of Bad Frog beer before final resolution
of the case).
213. The Court has upheld the restriction of profane or indecent speech in limited
circumstances. See Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundations, 438 U.S.
726 (1978). However, even the current doctrines governing obscenity are highly speech
protective, and can validly be called part of the 'heightened scrutiny' methodology. SMOLLA,
supra note 35, at § 2.01[3].
214.
We have a distinction, then, with no basis in the Constitution, with no justification
in the real world, and... that must often be applied arbitrarily in any but the easiest
cases. Still, we could live with the distinction if it led to the same degree of
protection speech would receive without it. Unfortunately, such is not the case.
Kozinski, supra note 40, at 648.
215. "If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary." THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).

